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THE ENTITLEMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
MEDICAL PATIENTS TO VULNERABLE
POPULATION STATUS FOR HUMAN
MEDICAL RESEARCH.
Elizabeth R McGuire t
INTRODUCTION
"RESPECT FOR PERSONS requires that subjects, to the degree
that they are capable, be given the opportunity to choose what
shall or shall not happen to them. This opportunity is provided
when adequate standards for informed consent are satisfied."' In-
formed consent is the key to addressing the increased vulnerability
of special populations when they are used in human medical re-
search. In some cases, prospective subjects for human medical re-
search are not in a position to give informed consent because they
are not autonomous and, therefore, not capable of the independent
decisionmaking necessary to consent. Persons incapable of giving
informed consent are unlikely to be able to protect their own inter-
ests.2 Their diminished capacity to protect themselves makes them
"vulnerable." 3 The ethical principle of respect for persons,4 im-
poses a special duty with respect to these "vulnerable" persons "to
the extent that their autonomy is limited, we show respect by pro-
tecting them from harm."'
While various methods of categorizing "vulnerable" populations
t This note was written under the supervision of Maxwell J. Mehlman, Professor of
Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. Special thanks goes to the members
of the Wade Park VA IRB, of which I was gratefully a member. The views expressed herein
are solely the author's.
1. Belmont Report, 44 Fed. Reg. 23192-23195 (1979). THE NATIONAL COMMISSION,
THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF
HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH (The National Commission for the Protection of Human
Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, April 18, 1979) [hereinafter BELMONT
REPORT].
2. Protection of Human Subjects, 38 Fed. Reg. 31738 (1973).
3. ROBERT J. LEVINE, ETHICS & REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 72, (2nd
ed. 1986).
4. ia at 15-16.
5. Id. at 97.
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have been advanced, each method attempts to identify "individuals
as vulnerable or less advantaged in ways that are relevant to their
suitability for selection as subjects."6 A two-step process has
evolved for managing vulnerable populations. First, the population
must be identified and evaluated as particularly vulnerable to
problems that might arise when members of that group participate
in medical research. Second, after a group has been identified, the
regulatory agency must determine the means necessary to provide
additional protection for the group. This note applies this two-step
process to medical patients of the Veterans Affairs ("VA").
VA medical patients constitute a unique and easily definable
group of people. The veteran using the VA system often does so
because he has few other viable alternatives for affordable medical
care. Once in the system, veterans relying on the VA for medical
care may become subjects in biomedical and behavioral research.7
This note considers whether those who regularly depend on the
VA system for their medical care should be classified as a vulnerable
population, deserving of additional protection designed to fully in-
sure their informed consent to participation in human medical re-
search. First, for those less familiar with the informed consent
process, basic concepts significant to the ethical use of humans in
medical research must be considered; the historical development of
consent requirements in both clinical medicine and research ex-
amined, and the development of federal policies protecting human
subjects in medical research reviewed. Second, the note examines
the identity of characteristics of vulnerable groups. Finally, the rea-
sons for identification and immediate inclusion of the VA patient as
a vulnerable group are considered.
I. PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
INFORMED CONSENT
Respect for autonomy, justice and beneficence are the three
founding ethical principles relevant to the issues of human medical
research and informed consent. These principles provide the basis
for more specific rules and requirements like those found in the
American professional codes of clinical medicine and research eth-
6. Id. at 72. Another definition of vulnerable groups can be "those who are relatively
(or absolutely) incapable of protecting their own interests. Id.
7. Oliver E. Meadows, The Department of Veterans Affairs Health Care System and
National Health Care, 66 ACAD. MED. 744, 744 (1991).
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ics discussed later.8 The principle of respect for autonomy demands
that people "be free to choose and act without controlling con-
straints imposed by others." 9 Beneficence requires physicians and
researchers to "do good" for the patient-subject and prevent harm
to that person.10 The principle of justice can be viewed alternately
in comparative or non-comparative concepts. Non-comparative
justice requires identification of what is due to a particular person
"without regard to the claims of others", while comparative justice
demands that people in "equal" positions be treated "equally" and
those who are "unequal" be treated differently.11 Although they
overlap to some degree, these principles are distinct and must be
considered separately when evaluating specific rules and behaviors.
A. Developments Leading to Consent Requirements
in Clinical Medicine
The Hippocratic Oath, the historic foundation of guidance for
medical ethics, requires physicians to choose measures to benefit the
sick according to the individual physician's ability and judgment.12
The Hippocratic Oath fails to address adequately the principle of
autonomy and the attendant need for communication between phy-
sician and patient.1 3
"Informed consent" appeared as an issue in American medicine
in 1957 when a California appellate court, in Salgo v. Leland Stan-
ford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, stated that physicians violated a duty
to their patients when they withheld any information necessary to
form the basis of intelligent consent by the patient to the proposed
treatment.14 The physician's duty to disclose was reviewed by the
8. RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF IN-
FORMED CONSENT 5 (1986).
9. Id. at 8.
10. LEVINE, supra note 3, at 16.
11. Id. at 17.
12. Robert M. Veatch, Medical Ethics: An Introduction, in MEDICAL ETHICS 1, 7-8
(Robert M. Veatch ed.) (1989). This early expression of the ethical principle of beneficence
required the physician to balance risks and benefits in a way similar to modem day risk-
benefit assessments. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 8, at 216. A risk-benefit ratio analy-
sis will determine the degree and likelihood of both injury and benefit to a given person.
BERNARD BARBER, INFORMED CONSENT IN MEDICAL THERAPY AND RESEARCH 3 (1980).
13. Id. at 61. See also Judith C. Areen, Bioethics and Law: The Second Stage: Balancing
Intelligent Consent and Individual Autonomy. The Marks Memorial Lecture for 1988-89, 31
ARIz. L. REv. 447, 449 (1989). The treatise that accompanied the Hippocratic Oath ex-
pressly advised physicians to conceal information from the patient while treating him. Id.
14. 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957). The Salgo court found that physicians
treating a patient who suffered permanent paralysis following a diagnostic aortography, were
negligent both in their performance of the procedure and in failing to inform him of the
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Kansas Supreme Court in Natanson v. Kline, when it held that the
individual is the master of his own body. 5 The court found that
"the duty of the physician to disclose, however, is limited to those
disclosures which a reasonable medical practitioner would make
under the same or similar circumstances."'
' 6
The nature and scope of this disclosure requirement was further
defined in Canterbury v. Spence, where the court distinguished the
physician's duty to disclose from the patient's right to compre-
hend. 7 The Canterbury court found that the physician's duty to
disclose information to the patient was based on the patient's right
of self-determination provided by law, and that the duty required all
information material to that decision be disclosed. 8 The Canter-
bury court noted that in the "duty to disclose cases, the focus of
attention is more properly upon the nature and content of the physi-
cian's divulgence than the patient's understanding or consent" and
that "the physician discharges the duty when he makes a reasonable
effort to convey sufficient information although the patient, without
fault of the physician, may not fully grasp it."' 9
To summarize, the modem doctrine of informed consent in
clinical medicine is rooted in the premise that adults have the right
to decide what is to be done to their bodies. Self-determination has
evolved into the informed consent choice which includes adequate
patient knowledge of the factors involved in treatment, including
the alternatives and risks of the proposed therapy.20 Disclosures
paralysis risk. Likewise, the court held that the physician may not minimize the known dan-
gers of a procedure or operation in order to induce his patient's consent. Id.
15. 350 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1960). One aspect of the physician's alleged negligence was the
failure to warn the patient of injuries possible from cobalt treatment. See also Cathy J. Jones,
Autonomy and Informed Consent in Medical Decisionmaking: Toward a New Self-Fulfilling
Prophecy, 47 WASH.& LEE L. REv. 379, 389 (1983). Not discussed by that court were the
meanings of full disclosure, therapeutic privilege, the bounds of physician discretion when
making less than full disclosure and the underlying basis for the doctrine of informed consent.
Id.
16. Natanson, 350 P.2d at 1106. Although the cause of action required that the issue be
evaluated from the patient's perspective, on the premise of a patient's right to self-determina-
tion, the court evaluated patient consent in light of the physician's duty to disclose certain
informationld, See also Jones, supra note 15, at 391.
17. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
18. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 786. The Canterbury court defined "materiality" as that
information to which a reasonable person would attach significance in deciding whether or
not to refuse the proposed treatment. Id. at 787, (quoting Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed
Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. Rav. 628, 640 (1970)).
19. Id. at 780 n.15.
20. Gerald F. Tietz, Informed Consent in the Prescription Drug Context: The Special
Case, 61 WASH. L. Rav. 367, 370 n.20 (1986). As the use of informed consent within the
clinical situation has traditionally been used to protect patients from risky procedures that
[Vol. 2:259
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limited to what a reasonable practitioner would make in the circum-
stances (Natanson) and what a reasonable person would find mate-
rial (Canterbury) have provided an "objective" standard of
causation for the tort remedies provided in the common law. This
objective standard requires the plaintiff to prove that a reasonable
person would have declined treatment after being made aware of
additional material facts.21 In contrast, a subjective standard would
focus on the effect of additional information on the decision of the
plaintiff-patient to undergo a particular therapy.
B. The Development of Ethical Consent Requirements in
Research Medicine
This section first examines the inherent differences between the
consent requirements needed for clinical medicine and clinical re-
search, and then reviews the historical development of ethical con-
sent requirements unique to the research setting and explores the
reasons why people can be particularly susceptible to outside influ-
ences that deny this right to free consent.
1. Inherent Differences Between Research and Clinical Medicine
Human medical research is inherently different from clinical
treatment. Phase I drug studies of pharmaceutical manufacturers
exemplify the traditional class of "nontherapeutic research" on
healthy volunteers. 22 In these human studies, which are typically
preceded by favorable animal experimentation, researchers study
pharmacokinetic drug parameters and side effects of various dos-
ages. 3 Research subjects are usually healthy volunteers who re-
ceive financial rewards and expect no particular therapeutic benefit
from study participation.24
In contrast, clinical trials do anticipate therapeutic benefit to re-
search subjects. Nonvalidated, or investigational, procedures for a
result in physical injury, generally the law has denied "recovery for inadequate disclosure in
the absence of bodily harm." Anne T. Corrigan, Note, A Paper Tiger: Lawsuits Against Doc-
tors for Nondisclosure of Economic Interests in Patients' Cells, Tissues and Organs, 42 CASE
W. REs. L. REV. 565, 579 (1992) (quoting Alan Meisel, A "Dignitary Tort" as a Bridge
Between the Idea of Informed Consent and the Law of Informed Consent, 16 L. MED. &
HEALTH CARE 210, 211 (1988).
21. Id.; See Tietz, supra note 20, at 374.
22. LEVINE, supra note 3, at 8, 23.
23. Dale L. Moore, Recurrent Issues in the Review of Medical Research on Human Sub-
jects, 1 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 1, 5 (1991). These pharmacokinetic parameters include drug
absorption, metabolism, and excretion. Id.
24. Id. Other examples of nontherapeutie research include discarded tissue studies and
blood specimen studies. Id. at 6.
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given disease are either new or in common use, but previously un-
tested scientifically. When nonvalidated procedures are conducted
within a rigid experimental protocol and the results compared to
common clinical treatment practices for a particular illness in
groups of patients afflicted with that disease, the resulting clinical
trial traditionally has been labeled "therapeutic research."25 Within
a properly designed research protocol, either treatment regimen is
equally valid at this initial point.2 6  Random clinical trials
("RCTs") are a special form of either therapeutic or non-therapeu-
tic research which use large numbers of subjects with different treat-
ment modalities (including a placebo/no treatment modality) which
are assigned randomly.27
Even though clinical trials anticipate therapeutic benefit, the re-
searcher has a conflict of interest in the patient's progress. The re-
searcher is interested primarily in acquiring medical knowledge, not
improvement of the subject's health.28 When a patient is asked by
his physician to participate in medical research, the patient may be
confused by the physician's new role as research investigator. All
physicians have the obligation, under the "principle of personal
care," to provide for their patients' well-being and "take whatever
measures are available to maximize the chances for a successful out-
come."2 9 But when a particular physician assumes the investiga-
tor's role, the obligation to optimize individual patient care is in
direct conflict with the acquisition of medical knowledge.
The patient often falls to understand the significance of the phy-
sician changing his role to that of investigator. This misunderstand-
ing, called "therapeutic misconception," leaves the patient believing
that whatever treatment he will receive is the one "most likely to
benefit him" and that there will be no major disadvantages to par-
25. Id. at 4-9.
26. Moore, supra note 23, at 7. This point is known as the "null hypothesis." Id.
27. LEVINE, supra note 3, at 185. The characteristics of random clinical trials include 1)
control where two or more similar populations receive different therapies (or placebo/no
therapy); 2) the determination of the significance of results through statistical analysis; 3)
double-blinded execution, when feasible, so neither researcher nor patient is aware of the
exact treatment; and 4) randomization, i.e., the therapies being compared are allocated
among the subjects by chance. Id.
28. Paul S. Appelbaum, Informed Consent and the therapeutic misconception, in NIH
READINGS ON PROTECTION OF BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH (Joan E.
Sieber ed.) 35, 36 (1982). Although in theory, for the group of subjects in a well-designed
project, the treatments are equally likely to be effective, in the individual case this is often
untrue. Subjects may have had previous negative experiences with side effects, etc. of a given
therapeutic regimen. Id at 36.
29. Paul S. Appelbaum, et al., False Hopes and Best Data: Consent to Research and the
Therapeutic Misconception, HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, Apr. 1987, at 20, 23.
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ticipation in research." Patients have difficulty believing that phy-
sicians "would either knowingly do something harmful to them, or
would knowingly use them simply as a means for their own ends."31
A common problem within medical research trials is that once an
individual is assigned to a therapeutic arm of the protocol, his treat-
ment will be rigidly defined by this protocol unless certain negative
clinical changes occur. Even though both treatment regimens may
be equivalent in the abstract for a particular patient, one may be
found to provide superior clinical results. The physician's freedom
to make these changes during a course of therapy is seriously lim-
ited in the research situation. The investigator is faced with a con-
flict of interest because to change an individual's therapy would
invalidate the study.
Although patients are potentially placed at risk (that they will
be assigned to a less effective treatment regimen) in order to gain
clinical knowledge, society continues to encourage research using
humans to continue the dramatic progression of medical knowledge
gained through such experimentation. 2 Because of this potential
risk, however, consent given within a research setting must be scru-
tinized more closely than in clinical medicine. 3
2. Historical Developments
Regulations were promulgated to control the risks created by
the growth of human medical research. 4 The more potentially
harmful, intrusive, or experimental the procedure, the stricter and
more numerous must be the safeguards to protect the individual.3
One of the earliest statements on ethical experimentation originated
with the war crimes trials following World War II. The Nuremberg
trials exposed "barbarous" experimentation on humans by Nazi
physicians. Judges responded by proclaiming the Nuremberg
30. Id In reality, potential disadvantages accompany the potential gains to be derived
from participation in research.
31. George J. Annas, The Changing Landscape of Human Experimentation: Nuremberg,
Helsinki, and Beyond, 2 HEALTH MATRIX 131 (1992).
32. VEATCH, supra note 12, at 127.
33. Tom L. Beauchamp, Informed Consent, in MEDICAL ETHICS supra note 12, at 173,
177.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 93-104.
35. See &g., GEORGE P. ANNAS ET. AL., INFORMED CONSENT To HUMAN EXPERI-
MENTATION: THE SuBJEcr's DILEMMA 171 (1977). (listing guidelines for determining when
extra protection is needed); see also Richard Delgado & Helen Leskovac, Informed Consent in
Human Experimentation: Bridging the Gap Between Ethical Thought and Current Practice,
34 UCLA L. REv. 67, 67 n.1 (1986).
1992]
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Code,3 6 considered "one of the premier human rights documents in
world history."37 The Nuremberg Code is derived from "universal
moral, ethical and legal concepts."38 "Voluntary, informed, compe-
tent, and understanding consent is required by the first Principle of
the Code, and Principle 9 gives the subject the right to withdraw
from the experiment."3 9 The Nuremberg Code provided a key defi-
nition of consent from which all subsequent codes and regulations
are derived.' Voluntary consent was required, and the investigator
was assigned the duty to obtain this consent.4" Thus, the Nurem-
berg Code replaced the concept that the professional's commitment
to his subject should be the sole protection for that subject with the
concept that the subject has a right to self-determination which, in
turn, requires informed consent.42
The continued discussion regarding appropriate disclosure in
medical research expanded into the legislative arena during the
post-war period after abuses similar to those banned by the Nurem-
berg trials were uncovered in America. A 1966 article in the New
England Journal of Medicine, disclosing extremely risky experimen-
tation conducted upon unknowing subjects, was the first of several
examples uncovering unethical research behavior.43 In the same
year, the Board of Regents of the State University of New York
censured several physicians for their role in the Jewish Chronic Dis-
ease Hospital Case in which subjects were exposed to live cancer
cells as part of a research protocol.' Later, the Willowbrook State
36. Annas, supra note 31, at 121. This code is unique in that it has a moral and legal
status different than others as it holds the status of representing international law. VEATCH,
supra note 12, at 20.
37. Annas, supra note 31, at 120-121.
38. Id. at 121.
39. Id.
40. See generally, FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 8, at 153-158.
41. Protection of Human Subjects; Informed Consent, 44 Fed. Reg. 44,713-44,714
(1979) [hereinafter Informed Consent]. First on the list often basic principles produced as a
result of the Nuremberg trials was that "the voluntary consent of the human subject was
absolutely essential." See also FADEN & BEAUCHAMPSUpra note 8, at 155. The remainder of
the Nuremberg code sets boundaries of acceptable research and describes the conditions
under which a subject may volunteerJd.
42. VEATCH, supra note 12, at 15. The Nuremberg code requires consent to be compe-
tent, voluntary, informed and understanding (or comprehending). ANNAS, supra note 31, at
121.
43. Jay Katz, The Regulation of Human Experimentation in the United States -A Per-
sonal Odyssey, 9 IRB: A REV. OF HUM. SUBJEcTS Ras. 1, 3 (1987). Henry Beecher, the
author of the article, was an American physician who revealed multiple examples of unethical
experiments in which patients were exposed to unacceptable risks without even knowing that
they were experimental subjects, much less being advised of the potential risks. Id.
44. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 8, at 162; see also Katz, supra note 43 at 2-3.
[Vol. 2:259
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School studies, in which children were infected with hepatitis, were
exposed in the 1970 book, Research and the Individual.45 Finally,
the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, where researchers withheld treatment
for syphilis for decades, was another famous case where the rights
of human subjects were knowingly violated over a prolonged period
of time.46
In the post- World War Il period, organizations such as the
American Medical Association as well as the federal legislature fo-
cused on the concept of the voluntary consent of the human sub-
ject.47 Accordingly, Congress created the National Commission for
the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral
Research ("National Commission"). 48 National Commission duties
included the creation of guidelines for informed consent and for
ethical research regulation. 49 In response to this mandate, the Na-
tional Commission suggested to the Department of Health and
Human Services ("HHS") ways to improve the regulation of ethical
human research. The Belmont Report, released in 1979 by the
Commission, identified the ethical principles underlying human re-
search and the subject areas to which they apply.50 The principle of
respect for persons prompted the National Commission to outline
guidelines for informed consent;5 1 the principle of beneficence led
The patients were not informed that live cancer cells were being used or that the experiment
was designed to measure their ability to "reject [these] foreign cells," a test unrelated to their
normal therapeutic program. Id.
45. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 8, at 163. At the Willowbrook school for men-
tally retarded children, newly admitted children were deliberately infected with infectious
hepatitis in an effort to develop a prophylactic agent against this disease. Id.
46. Id. at 165. This study comparing the health and longevity of untreated syphilitic
populations with similar disease-free populations continued decades after antibiotic treat-
ments were available to cure this disease. The subjects, poor blacks, were never clearly in-
formed, and they suffered a significantly higher rate of complications and morbidity from the
disease than the control group. Id at 166.
47. Informed Consent, supra note 41, at 47,715; in 1964, the Declaration of Helsinki
expanded the Nuremberg philosophy and further refined ethical consent requirements. Alex-
ander M. Capron, Human Experimentation, in BIoLAw 217, 233 (James F. Childress et al.
eds., 1986). The World Medical Association adopted the Declaration of Helsinki in 1964.
The Declaration was similar to the Nuremberg Code in that primary reliance was on the
individual investigator. The difference between therapeutic and non-therapeutic research also
was identified. Id. at 220.
48. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 8, at 215-16.
49. See id. at 216. The Commission was specifically directed to explore the need for
unique ethical research requirements within certain identified vulnerable groups; children,
prisoners and the institutionalized mentally infirm. Id.; See also Informed Consent, supra
note 41, at 47,713, 47,716.
50. See BELMONT REPORT, supra note 1, at 23, 194-95.
51. See Carol Levine, Has AIDS Changed the Ethics of Human Subjects Research?, 16
LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 167, 168 (1988). Respect for persons incorporates the ethical
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to risk-benefit assessment; and the principle of justice led to rules
for the appropriate selection of subjects. 2
3. Why People Are Vulnerable
The National Commission was directed to identify the ethical
requirements for informed consent in research involving various
groups of subjects considered particularly "vulnerable."53 The Nu-
remberg Code demanded voluntary consent that required that the
person consenting have the legal capacity to give consent, be situ-
ated in a way that enabled him to consent freely without any form
of constraint or coercion, and possess sufficient knowledge and
comprehension of the subject involved. 4 The Nuremberg Code
also identified the issue of special vulnerability when it recognized
the ethical problems of using groups that could not consent to par-
ticipate in research." This premise that voluntary consent was es-
sential for the conduct of ethical research created problems when
researchers opted to use groups of individuals who cannot "con-
sent" because they lack the freedom to voluntarily choose (prison-
ers), the legal capacity to give consent (children), or the ability to
understand consent (the mentally infirm). 6
Several aspects of informed consent can be more clearly under-
stood using a contract law model.57 If informed consent is a special
type of consensual contract, then analysis of the elements needed
for the formation of a general contract may aid in understanding
what is at risk when dealing with those groups considered particu-
larly vulnerable to the consent process.5 8The law of contracts deter-
convictions that individuals should be treated as autonomous agents and that persons with
diminished autonomy are entitled to protection. Id.
52. Id. People are treated in an ethical manner not only by respecting their decisions
and protecting them from harm; but also by making efforts to secure their well-being.
53. LEvINF, supra note 3, at 235. In Public Law 93-348, Congress gave the National
Commission a directive to identify what special requirements were needed in order to get the
appropriate informed consent for research involving children, prisoners and the institutional-
ized mentally infirm. Id.
54. See generally FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 8, at 153-58.
55. LEVINE, supra note 3, at 235.
56. Id.
57. See id., supra note 3, at 325-41. The disclosure and comprehension guidelines are
clearly defined within the federal regulations. The remaining elements of legal competency
and autonomy will be discussed below within the contract law model for vulnerable groups.
Id.
58. See Diane K. Kjervik & Sandra J. Grove, The Legal Meaning of Consent in Unequal
Power Relationships, 4 J. PRoF. NUIsNG 192, 193 (1988). The legal concept of consent is
that consent operates as a waiver of one's right to object to others' assertion of power over
him or her. Id.
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mines first who is capable and incapable of consenting to, i.e.,
entering into a contract. These determinations of capacity are
based both on "public policy," as in the case where an entire class of
persons is rendered incapable of contracting, and on case-by-case
determinations based on particular circumstances involved. The
law then determines, on a case-by-case basis, whether the circum-
stances render the particular "consent" so involuntary or unin-
formed as to be invalid.59This definition contains two key elements:
the ability or capacity to contract and the voluntary choice (voli-
tion) to contract.' To fall within its parameters, a person must
possess both the ability to engage in the cognitive powers of reason-
ing and the ability to exercise the volitional powers of choice. With-
out these basic capacities, actual consent is irrelevant because the
person is incapable of contracting ab initio. The capacity to consent
is merely a baseline as it only requires that one have the inherent
capability to choose and not that he has actually done so.61
A contract will be found to be invalid if the second element of
voluntary or autonomous choice can be shown to be lacking.62 Au-
tonomy requires that a person act intentionally,6" with understand-
ing64 and free from controlling influences. 65  "Intentionally" is
defined in terms broad enough to include situations where the indi-
vidual consciously chooses a course of action even though he is only
tolerating the negative aspects of the consequences. 66 Actions can-
not be both autonomous and controlled by outside influences, so
that when outside forces control someone's decision, these forces
invariably serve to deny him the right to act in his own self-
interest.67
Because autonomy, in the absolute terms mentioned above, may
be too idealistic to achieve in many real-life situations, informed
consent is considered to occur when a person possesses substantial
59. Id. at 193-94 (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 194.
61. Id.
62. Id. The Nuremberg Code also demanded autonomy when it dictated that "[a] per-
son.., involved should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice without
the intervention of any element of fraud, deceit, duress, over-reaching or other ulterior form
of constraint or coercion." Nuremberg Code Principle 1. See LEVINE, supra note 3, at 425.
63. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 8, at 242-48.
64. Id at 249-55.
65. Id. at 238.
66. Id. at 242-48. An example of negative outcomes that some might be more willing
to endure would be a disfiguring scar for a person undergoing surgery in the hopes of curing
cancerJd.
67. Id. at 256.
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understanding and, without substantial external control, intention-
ally authorizes a professional to do something for him.6" When a
person's level of understanding and freedom in informed consent
situations is equivalent to what he would have when making a con-
tract or accepting a job offer, then substantial autonomy has been
achieved.6 9
Contract law addresses impediments to the ability to make a
voluntary or autonomous choice. It identifies the two major imped-
iments as "the law of duress" and "the law of undue influence."'70
While duress affects free choice through coercive, threatening pres-
sure, undue influence coerces people with rewards or promises.71
Withholding information, playing on emotions, or presenting con-
straints in a particular manner can effectively control a person's be-
havior to the extent that it prevents him from being able to make a
free choice.72
Personal autonomy requires freedom from external controls that
rob the person of independence.73 While it may be acceptable to
influence a person's behavior, one cannot control another's behavior
and remain within the ethical limits of informed consent.74 This
distinction explains why actions substantially autonomous rather
than absolutely autonomous satisfy the ethical requirements of in-
formed consent. Given this distinction, some influences are tolera-
ble while others exceed ethical limits. The three types of external
influence that will be discussed are coercion, persuasion and
manipulation.
"Coercion occurs if one party intentionally and successfully in-
fluences another by presenting a credible threat of unwanted or
avoidable harm so severe that the person is unable to resist acting to
avoid it."' 75 The person subject to coercive influences will choose to
participate in research not because he is willing to endure the incon-
venience or discomfort for altruistic reasons, but to avoid a greater
harm. 76 This type of influence is never compatible with the autono-
68. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETH-
Ics 79-81 (3d ed.) at 76 (1985).
69. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 8, at 240-41.
70. Id.
71. Ruth Macklin, "Due" and "Undue" Inducements: On Paying Money to Research
Subjects, 3 IRB, A REv. OF HUM. SUBJECTS RESEARCH 1, 1 (1981).
72. See, e.g., Beauchamp, supra note 33, at 188.
73. Id. at 256.
74. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 8, at 258.
75. Id. at 339.
76. Id. at 338-343.
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mous action required for informed consent.
Persuasion, in contrast, is defined as influence which never con-
trols behavior to the extent that it denies the person the ability to
make an autonomous choice. Persuasion can be defined as "the in-
tentional and successful attempt to induce a person, through ap-
peals to reason, to freely accept, as his or her own, the beliefs,...
advocated by the persuader."77 Because a person subject to persua-
sion is not denied his self-directed behavior, this form of influence
does not violate personal autonomy.
Manipulation, the third category, falls between coercion and
persuasion. Manipulation will often influence another's behavior to
a degree which denies his self-directed or autonomous behavior.
Manipulation through rewards or other beneficial offers (i.e. manip-
ulation of the options) can be the most difficult form to guard
against.7" This concept is virtually identical to the contract law
concept of undue influence previously discussed.7 9
The affirmative act of "consent" is the last stage of the process
where a potential subject "signifies his willingness to become a sub-
ject by consenting."8 " This process, which usually involves the
signing of a consent form, is similar to signing a contractual agree-
ment." Effective informed consent requires that the signing indi-
cates an active authorization that is more than passive express
agreement or compliance with an arrangement.8 2 When the con-
tract signed is between two parties of extremely unequal power, the
more powerful of the two, the investigator in the research context,
is also considered to be acting as a fiduciary for the other party. 3
The need of a fiduciary, such as the physician or investigator, to
protect the best interests of the subject potentially conflicts with the
research goals of advancing medical knowledge.8" Conflicts of in-
terests cannot be ignored since autonomy is considered to be the
77. Id. at 347.
78. Id. at 354-56. The three basic categories of manipulation include manipulation of
options, manipulation of information and psychological manipulation. Id. at 354-65.
79. Macklin, supra note 71, at 6. For example, when a subject feels compelled to do
something deceitful, such as giving false medical information, in order to qualify for research
participation, then the external influence to include him within this study is "undue." An
undue influence is a promise or reward which is excessively high with respect to that patient's
situation and may result in the subjects lying,for example, to insure participation in research.
Id.
80. LEVINE, supra note 3, at 123.
81. Id.
82. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 68, at 76.
83. Kjervik & Grove, supra note 58, at 123.
84. Appelbaum, supra note 29, at 26.
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element most affected when the two parties are of unequal power.85
In addition to instances of intentional manipulation, there is a
form of unintentional manipulation equally capable of denying au-
tonomous choice to participate in research. This unintentional ma-
nipulation occurs through "role constraints." "[A] person's role
can carry with it certain expectations for behavior and consequent
intentional actions that function to limit or constrain that person's
autonomous expression.
' '1 6
People within certain roles are capable of manipulating situa-
tions to an extent sufficient to prevent autonomous decisions even
when there is no intention to do so.87 While this occurs throughout
life, for the purpose of this discussion, role constraint is important
because it causes patients to act in ways that they otherwise would
not act if not under a peculiarly intense and oppressive situation
resulting from a patient's dependent status, especially if he was par-
ticularly vulnerable. 88 Often the person placed in a position of rela-
tive powerlessness reacts by becoming passive and empowering the
authority figure to control and even dictate his personal decisions
and actions in ways he would ordinarily not tolerate.89 Autonomy
was also the element considered at risk within the contracts model
when there was a great degree of inequality between the parties.'
These basic concepts can be directly applied to the informed con-
sent situation in which the investigator's position of significantly
greater power may act as a role constraint deny free choice to par-
ticipate in research for.
If interpretation of research-related informed consent for vul-
nerable populations would use the same objective reasonable person
standard that has been used for other, less vulnerable groups, the
peculiarities of the individual subject's protection will be entirely
lost. It is imperative to remember that it is the individual's subjec-
tive interpretation of a situation that is important when determining
whether the particular situation has deprived an individual of his
85. Kjervik & Grove, supra note 58, at 192.
86. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 8, at 368.
87. Id. The acceptable alternatives to a situation may be constrained either because
people "intentionally structure particular encounters with that person in manipulative ways"
or "social or cultural arrangements and expectations for the role the person assumes can
function as constraints on autonomous expression." Id.
88. Id. at 369. General circumstances of societal constraints must be distinguished from
particular situations. Examples cited were that of hospitalized patients, prisoners, students
and employees. Id.
89. Id.
90. Kjervik & Grove, supra note 58, at 192.
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right to choose research participation voluntarily. Because vulnera-
ble people are more susceptible to coercive threats or manipulation,
they will lose the protection against this behavior if the situation is
viewed from the traditional objective, "reasonable person" standard
used for others in both research and clinical situations.91
People within vulnerable groups should not be considered to be
objectively reasonable and should not be evaluated as if they are. If
an objective standard is to be used to measure consent in these
cases, the standard must be re-formulated to account for the sub-
jects' greater vulnerability. The standard should ask how a "rea-
sonable person who is particularly vulnerable to manipulation or
coercion because of his excessively dependent status" would view
the situation in which the person is asked to participate in research.
This change in criteria would better guard against the dramatically
greater possibility of overt or passive manipulation in the form of
role constraints.
C. Formal Federal Policies Regulating Human
Medical Research
Informed consent in the research setting is primarily controlled
through federal statutes and regulatory interpretation of these stat-
utes.92 As a consequence, the protection provided by informed con-
sent in medical research, as defined by these various regulatory
bodies, has moved away from compensation for previously inflicted
injuries to a prospective system designed to prevent these harms
from occurring.9 The requirement for a patient's express consent
to research participation was part of the changes to the Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act in the Drug Amendments of 1962, which also
refined the statutory power of the Food And Drug Administration
("FDA") to regulate drug research.94
Another unique feature protecting informed consent within the
91. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 8, at 343.
92. PAUL S. APPELBAUM ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT, LEGAL THEORY AND
CLINICAL PRACTICE 211 (1987). While clinical consent to medical treatment is largely a
creature of case law, with later statutory modifications, research consent has been almost
exclusively shaped by professional codes, statutes and administrative regulations. Id.
93. Corrigan, supra note 20, at 581.
94. Informed Consent, supra note 41, at 44,714. These amendments were partially a
result of the thalidomide drug disaster. Pregnant mothers for whom thalidomide was pre-
scribed had not been informed that they were taking an experimental drug or that its safety to
their unborn fetus was unknown. The mothers who received this medication later gave birth
to children with birth defects. See Katz, supra note 43, at 3. Federal Food, Drug and Cos-
metic Act, as amended (§§ 201-902, 52 Stat. 1040 as amended; 21 U.S.C. §§ 321-392) (1970).
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research setting was the creation of the requirement of prior ap-
proval of each research project by the local Institutional Review
Boards ("IRBs") created by the 1962 Amendments.9" The IRB ful-
fills its duty as a watchdog of patient's safety and rights by evaluat-
ing all research within the institution it encompasses.96 The
regulations specify the number and type of IRB members as well as
the IRB's goals with respect to informed consent, risk assessment
and appropriate research design.97
The regulatory approach of the HHS and FDA, using the IRB
at its heart, controls with tighter specifications for consent than
does the common law tort protection offered for clinical medicine.9"
Although IRBs are considered to operate efficiently in general, the
lack of a system for these decentralized bodies to share information
and establish precedent in the resolution of difficult studies weakens
the system.99
The new FDA requirements led to similar regulation within the
National Institutes of Health ("NIH").boo In 1973, congressional
hearings prompted additional protections in the National Research
Act of 1974.01 The Secretary of the Health, Education and Wel-
fare Department, (now the Department of Health and Human Serv-
ices ("HHS")), was directed to establish IRBs at all institutions
using the Department as a source of research funding, and to create
95. See Food and Drug Administration: Part 56 - Institutional Review Boards, 21
C.F.R. §§ 50, 56 (1991)[hereinafter Institutional Review Boards].
96. Moore, supra note 23, at 8. Subject risks are minimized by scrutinizing procedures
for good research design and avoidance of unnecessary risks. The procedures for obtaining
informed consent and the informed consent form itself are reviewed, as is subject selection
criteria. The potential risks to subjects is weighed against the anticipated benefit to those
subjects and the importance of the knowledge obtained. Id. at 8-9.
97. Id. at 11.
98. APPELBAUM, supra note 92, at 227.
99. Id. Other problems include the fact that the primary responsibility for obtaining
informed consent is upon the principal investigator, that certain categories of research permit
waivers of informed consent, and that the system lacks an effective remedy for violations. See
also Delgado & Leskovac, supra note 35, at 76-79.
100. Protection of Human Subjects, 47 Fed. Reg. 52,880, 52,911 (1982) [herinafter 1982
Human Subjects]. See also Katz, supra note 43, at 3. It was determined that future Public
Health Service ("PHS") funding, sponsored through the NIH, would be forthcoming only if
prior approval by the local IRB and procurement of informed consent by each principal
investigator were obtained. LEviNE, supra note 3, at 146. With this NIH enactment, the
mold for all subsequent regulation was set in a "decentralized, institution-based, prospective
review of research, with informed consent explicitly required as part of the process of subject
recruitment." APPELBAUM, supra note 92, at 217.
101. Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat.342 (1974). This statute established the National Com-




a basic framework for ethical human research in the United
States.'°2 These regulations were later recommended by the Presi-
dent's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine
and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, in existence from 1980-
1983, '03 to provide the basic framework for other agencies to adopt
in their regulation of human research."°
1. The HHS Model of Regulation
The HHS model of regulation, also known as the "Institutional
Assurance System," is the dominant model for the protection of
human subjects."0 5 This system is applicable to situations in which
a government agency, such as HHS, sponsors human research.
10 6
The HHS regulations stipulate that an institution receiving funds
for research must provide satisfactory written assurance to the Sec-
retary that it will comply with the requirements of 45 C.F.R. 46.107
These regulations require prior review by the local IRB to deter-
mine if these governmental standards will be met.108 Once local
IRB and other institutional approval is acquired, the research pro-
posal is sent to the federal agency from which funding is being
sought. 19
2. The FDA Model of Regulation
The FDA operates under a fundamentally different model
known as the "Retrospective System."' 10 The FDA does not spon-
sor drug research and, therefore, has only indirect control of the
102. Basic HHS Policy for Protection of Human Research Subjects, 45 C.F.R. § 46
(1991)[hereinafter Protection of Human Subjects]. See also Capron, supra note 47, at 234.
103. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 8, at 221. This commission was authorized in
November 1978 by the U.S. Congress and was first convened in January 1980 to continue the
work of the National Commission on ethical issues that were of interest to the general public.
Clinical treatment issues were the major focus, rather than recommendations about federal
policies. Id. at 96-97.
104. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN
MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, PROTECTING HUMAN SUB-
JECTS, 67-71 (1981) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION]. This recommendation was re-
peated in 1983 (See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, IMPLEMENTING HUMAN RESEARCH
REGULATIONS, 8-10 (1983).
105. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 8, at 222.
106. Id. at 217-252. Approximately two dozen federal agencies fund research in a system
similar to the HHS. Id
107. Protection of Human Subjects, supra note 102, § 46.101.
108. LEVINE, supra note 3 at 325-28.
109. Id.
110. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 8, at 202-04.
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institution conducting the research.I1 I Investigational drugs are
those drugs being studied for human use but not yet approved by
the FDA.112 As a result, rather than obtaining prospective assur-
ances of compliance to ethical standards through IRB scrutiny, the
FDA reviews the adequacy of human subject protection retrospec-
tively, during its approval procedure. The drug sponsor bears the
responsibility to insure protocol compliance and IRB approval, and
risks refusal of the application for a new product if the research in
support materials is unethically produced.113
3. The VA System of Regulation
The Veterans Administration, now the Department of Veterans
Affairs, is a health entity distinct from other United States health
care. Its duties include the "four statutory missions of furnishing
quality health care to veteran patients; conducting medical, health
services, and rehabilitation research; educating and training health
care providers; and acting as the backup health care system for the
Department of Defense in time of war or national emergency. 1 4
During the 1970's, the VA independently issued research guidelines
similar, but not identical, to those issued by HHS.115 Not unlike
the FDA, the statutory coverage for the VA system is independent
but parallel to the HHS regulations and the National Commission
recommendations.116 The VA, while attempting to comply with the
recommendations of the National Commission, was free to interpret
these recommendations in its own unique fashion.
Although forms used by the VA system initially were different
than those mandated, by 1979 several changes had been made to
comply with the new HHS recommendations.117 Although differ-
11. Id.
112. Moore, supra note 23, at 5 n.9. The term investigational is a term of art; "[blefore a
drug can be studied in humans, its sponsor must submit an Investigational New Drug Appli-
cation to the FDA." Id. (quoting Kessler, The Regulation of Investigational Drugs, 320 NEw
ENG. J. MED. 281, 282 (1989)).
113. Institutional Review Boards, supra note 95 § 50.103. See also Capronsupra note 47,
at 148.
114. Meadows, supra note 7, at 744.
115. Marilyn T. Baker & Harvey A. Taub, Readability of Informed Consent Forms for
Research in a Veterans Administration Medical Center, 250 JAMA 2646, 2646 (1983).
116. See infra note 110-113 and accompanying text.
117. Veterans Administration, Department of Medicine and Surgery, Circular 10-79-232
(September 25, 1979) [hereinafter VA Circular 10-79-232]. The additional information ap-
pearing in later forms included that required by 43 Fed. Reg. 51,559, providing information
about compensation and treatment of injured clinical research participants for all projects
supported by research funds from HHS. See Baker & Taub, supra note 115, at 2646. Prior to
1975, the consent form signed by subjects participating in human research within the VA
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ences in form remained, the overall requirements were nearly
identical.1 II
As the federal regulations developed within the HHS, FDA and
VA (in addition to the other parallel agencies not at issue here), the
requirements of these three major agencies continued to be inter-
twined. An example from a VA Department of Medicine and Sur-
gery bulletin clearly shows the interrelationship: "VA investigators
receiving HHS funds, whether by direct grant or through affiliated
institution, must comply with both VA and HHS regulations.
Many investigators will also have to comply with FDA regulations
on clinical testing of new drugs and devices." 119
The VA requirements differ from the HHS guidelines in certain
respects which include several policies that are more restrictive.
These differences include the VA policy of: prohibiting expedited
review, which permits two IRB committee members to individually
review a research protocol and approve it before the monthly meet-
ing;120 prohibiting the use of exempt research categories of re-
search, such as education testing, which are not subject to HHS
regulations are still subject to VA regulatory review; 121 prohibiting
the waiver of informed consent as an abbreviated consent procedure
which changes or eliminates certain elements of informed con-
sent;122 prohibiting "short form" written consent which allows oral
presentation of the informed consent procedure to certain potential
subjects; 123 and prohibiting cash payments to hospital inpatients.124
Further, the VA requires multi-center cooperative research studies
involving individual VA medical centers to obtain VA IRB approval
system was "VA Form 10-1086." In 1975, this form was revised to include an information
sheet specific to a particular study. Id. at 2646. However, the investigator could waive the
requirement for this signed consent if, in his professional judgment, it was not feasible or in
the best interest of the patient to have this form signed. Id.
118. VA Circular 10-79-232, supra note 117. When the VA Circular 10-79-232 is com-
pared to 45 C.F.R. 46 § 116 (1983), it can be seen that both contain similar requirements.
The HHS regulations spelled out certain details more clearly. The VA required information
regarding the purpose of the investigation, the procedures used, any known risks anticipated,
benefits anticipated, alternate courses of action, the anticipated result if no therapy is under-
taken and a statement that the subject may withdraw at any time without prejudice. Id.
119. Veterans Administration, Department of Medicine and Surgery, Interim Issue 10-
81-44 (October 8, 1981). The purpose of this bulletin was to inform the individual VA cen-
ters of modifications to their Research Policy and Procedure Manual, M-3, Pt. 1, Ch. 1.
120. Protection of Human Subjects, supra note 102, § 46.110.
121. Id. §46.101(2)(b).
122. Id. §46.116(c).
123. Id. §46.117 (b)(2).
124. Office of Science and Technology; Proposed Model Federal Policy for Protection of
Human Subjects, 51 Fed. Reg. 20,204, 20,217 (1986)[hereinafter Proposed Model Policy].
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in addition to IRB approval of the other research center. 125
The VA position prohibiting expedited review, was codified by
1982.126 This position is in contrast to the FDA and HHS, which
have accepted the recommendations regarding expedited review by
the National Commission. 127
4. The Common Rule128
While the VA, historically, has been permitted to define its own
parameters for medical research, if the research performed within
the VA system is funded by the HHS or used FDA controlled
pharmaceuticals or medical devices, other procedural rules also ap-
ply. This regulatory overlap was the impetus for the Office of Sci-
ence and Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President, to
follow through on the recommendations of the President's Commis-
sion to establish a Proposed Model Federal Policy for Protection of
Human Subjects.1 29 The "Model Federal Policy" sought to elimi-
nate unnecessary duplication in the regulation of human medical
research. On June 18, 1991, this Model Policy appeared as a final
rule in the Federal Register.1 30 This model policy has been desig-
nated "the common rule."1 31 A month later the FDA amended its
rules to be in substantial compliance with the common rule.13 2
Research investigators within the VA must comply with either
the HHS Institutional Assurance system, the FDA Retrospective
system, or both depending upon the research funding source. Addi-
tionally, VA researchers must also meet specific regulatory require-
125. Id.
126. Veterans Administration, Department of Medicine and Surgery, Circular 10-82-88
(May 25, 1982) [hereinafter VA Circular 10-82-88]. The prohibition of expedited review first
appeared in VA Circular 10-82-88 and later was incorporated into the 1985 M-3, Pt. I, Ch. 9,
9.03. This later circular stated that although allowed by HHS and FDA regulations, any
research using VA patients, resources or staff must submit to complete VA IRB and Research
and Development review. Id.
127. Protection of Human Subjects, 43 Fed. Reg. 56,173-89 (1978).
128. Joan P. Porter, The Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 13 IRB, A
REV. OF HUM. SuBJEcrs RESEARCH 4 (1991). The common rule, previously known as the
Model Rules, replaced the 1981 version of Subpart A of the Department of Health and
Human Services regulations known as 45 C.F.R. Part 46. Id.
129. Id. In May 1982, the chairman of Federal Coordinating Counsel for Science, Engi-
neering, and Technology (FCCSET) consulted with the Office of Science and Technology
Policy (OSTP) and the Office of Management and Budget with the goal of developing these
model rules. Id.
130. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects; notices and rules, 56 Fed. Reg.
28002 (1991)[hereinafter Federal Policy Regulations].
131. Porter, supra note 128.
132. Federal Policy Regulations, supra note 130, at 28,025.
[Vol. 2:259
VA PATIEN7S
ments that the VA has established for investigators within its
system, independent of outside or internal VA funding of the re-
search. However, in 1986, during the initial proposal of the Model
Federal Policy, the VA was recognized as unique; certain exceptions
to the uniform rules were recognized at the outset. VA will con-
tinue intramural research and development practices of not permit-
ting exempted research [§ 46.101(2)(b)] or expedited review
(§ 46.110), not permitting waiver of informed consent [§ 46.116(c)]
or "short form" written consent [§ 46.117(b)(2)], and not requiring
written institutional assurances from VA medical centers
[§ 46.103(a)]. Further, regarding cooperative research efforts under
§ 114, VA requires that each VA medical center which participates
in a cooperative or multi-hospital project must obtain the approval
of its own Human Studies Subcommittee for such research. 133
II. ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AS APPLIED TO
VULNERABLE GROUPS-THE GENERAL ELEMENTS OF
VULNERABLE GROUPS AND APPROPRIATE USE OF
GROUPS CONSIDERED VULNERABLE
This section explains why VA medical patients should be consid-
ered a vulnerable group. First, I describe general characteristics of
certain groups considered particularly vulnerable, and therefore un-
likely to give effective informed consent, and the consequences of
this increased vulnerability. Then I describe the VA medical patient
and the VA system in which he receives his care. I also consider a
similar patient population, prisoners, and discuss the development
of regulation governing their use as research subjects. Finally, in
the final section of the note, I argue that the the VA patient also
should be considered a vulnerable group.
A. Who Is Considered Vulnerable
The National Commission identified several groups it consid-
ered to be vulnerable: prisoners, children and those institutional-
ized as mentally infirm.
The Belmont Report also included in its characterization of
"vulnerable subjects" those who are economically disadvantaged.134
Economically disadvantaged people are among those who could
be characterized as a "captive population." Captive populations en-
compass those segments of American society who have come to rely
133. Proposed Model Federal Policy, 51 Fed. Reg. 20,204-17 (1986).
134. Belmont Report, supra note 1, at 23,197.
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on the government for fundamental services.' 35 Groups with the
potential to be considered to be "captive" include young children,
the incarcerated, the sick and the elderly. 36 Most people are de-
pendent on others in some way. Captive populations, by definition,
are so dependent upon the outside agency providing personal
health services to them that they are subject to control by their
caretakers.137 Key ethical principles are threatened when this de-
pendency causes an individual to fear he might forfeit his ability to
remain within a desirable situation if he refuses to participate in
research.
The broader and more significant the needs of this captive popu-
lation, the greater the degree of dependency its members have on
those providing assistance to them. People within captive popula-
tions, being highly dependent upon those providing needed services,
are likely to be particularly susceptible to role constraints. Depen-
dency relationships create a significant possibility that "role con-
straints" will compromise autonomous decisions. 138
Investigators often take advantage of the fact that some institu-
tions accumulate large populations of individuals who are suitable
as research subjects. They establish their research facilities in geo-
graphic proximity to these institutions to lower costs and ease the
burdens of subject recruitment.1 39 This phenomenon, known as
"administrative availability," becomes a problem of comparative
justice when the location results in a disproportionate use of certain
economic or racial groups."
Although dependent subjects may fear the consequences of fail-
ure to cooperate with the physician/investigator, 4' (as it is unlikely
these patients would be actually denied future care if they refuse to
participate in research), this perceived threat may not withstand the
scrutiny of an objective, reasonable person standard. However, the
reality of the continued treatment should not lessen the significance
that the patient's perception may potentially cheat him of a volun-
tary choice to participate in research. Vulnerable groups are sus-
ceptible to role constraints which may operate to subjectively
influence behavior so as to deny autonomy, even when the domi-
135. JENNIE J. KRONENFELD & MARCIA L. WHICKER, CAPTIVE POPULATIONS: CAR-
ING FOR THE YOUNG, THE SICK, THE IMPRISONED, AND THE ELDERLY 1 (1990).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 11.
138. Id. Examples include hospitals, military camps and prisons. Id.
139. Id.
140. See generally LEVINE, supra note 3, at 79-81.
141. Id. at 82.
280 [Vol. 2:259
VA PATIENTS
nant person has no intention to do so. Persons who are totally de-
pendent on an institution may submit to perceived or actual
pressures to conform with institutional requests out of fear of being
denied services or privileges. If the quality of medical care, staff
attention, or living conditions are poor, an invitation to move into a
special unit or research ward may be irresistibly appealing.142If the
objective standard were modified to account for the perceptions of
these vulnerable people, measures to effectively counter these addi-
tional fears would be put into place to minimimize the risk of violat-
ing the principles of ethical consent.
B. The Demands of Justice for Those Particularly Vulnerable
Comparative justice requires that increased vulnerability be
countered with increased scrutiny in the selection of these subjects
for use in medical research. Although the analysis of "respect for
persons" and "justice" can be viewed separately, they become more
interrelated within the vulnerable population than they are for the
general subject population.143
Because vulnerable groups are incapable of protecting their in-
terests, the ethical principle of justice intervenes to question why
these groups were chosen in the first place.1  The goal is to identify
individuals as vulnerable or less advantaged in ways that are rele-
vant to their suitability for selection as subjects.14 5 Justice is said to
require activities designed to yield direct benefits to the individual
subjects and to encourage research designed to benefit that particu-
lar population. There should be general restraint from involving
the special populations in research irrelevant to their individual
conditions or to conditions uncommon to their class. 146
The National Commission was concerned about the principle of
justice, and it examined the requirements for equitable distribution
of the benefits and burdens of research. It concluded that when a
group of people are particularly vulnerable to undue influence,
other less vulnerable subjects should be used whenever possible.147
142. Natalie Reatig, Research with Vulnerable Populations: Ethical Considerations and
Federal Regulations, in NIH READINGS OF BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH
181, 182-83 (Joan E. Sieber ed., 1983).
143. LEVINE, supra note 3, at 72.
144. Id. at 236. These people are "vulnerable or disadvantaged in ways that are 'morally
relevant' to their research involvement." Id.
145. Id. at 72.
146. Id.
147. Karen Lebacqz, Beyond Respect for Persons & Beneficence: Justice in Research, 2
IRB: A REV. OF HUM. SuBJECrS REs. 1, 3 (1980).
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If the primary reason for using a group of people is because they are
more accessible, or administratively available, then not using other,
less vulnerable subjects violates the principle ofjustice. 4 This con-
clusion was not based on a general concern for excessive research
risks to the subjects. 49 Instead, the Commission focused on the
equitable distribution of all research burdens.
To summarize, the use of vulnerable groups is not expressly for-
bidden by any ethical or regulatory parameters. Rather, the Na-
tional Commission called for justification of any plan including
vulnerable subjects, with this justification becoming increasingly
difficult as the degree of risk or degree of vulnerability increases.150
The plan must demonstrate that either the quality of the vulnerable
person's consent is improved by increasing his capacity to consent
(addressing respect for persons) or he is preferentially excluded and
subjects more capable of consent are chosen (addressing justice).' 5 '
C. A Characterization of the VA Medical Patient
in the VA System
The Belmont Report included in its characterization of vulnera-
ble subjects those who are economically disadvantaged. 52  As
shown below, economic realities have forced VA patients to become
a captive population in ways that may jeopardize their ability to
voluntarily choose research participation.
1. The VA Medical Patient
Of the estimated twenty-seven million U. S. veterans,' 53 only
those falling within certain eliligibility guidelines are entitled to re-
ceive health care from the VA medical system. 5 4 Today, the gener-
148. LEVINE, supra note 3, at 79. Certain institutions tend to accumulate significant
populations suitable for specific types of research. Examples include hospitals, schools, wel-
fare agencies and places of employment. Many investigators capitalize on this when they
establish research units near these facilities. Although the investigator benefits from the lower
expenses and minimized inconvenience in subject recruitment. Locating near vulnerable
groups can result in an unfair share of the research burdens being placed on these popula-
tions. Id.
149. Protection of Human Subjects; Research Involving Prisoners, 42 Fed. Reg. 3076,
3078 (1977) [hereinafter Research Involving Prisoners].
150. LEVINE, supra note 3, at 87.
151. Id. at 236.
152. BELMONT REPORT, supra note 1, at 23,197.
153. John A. Gronvall, Medical Care of Low-Income Veterans in the VA Health Care
System, 6 HEALTH AFFAIRS 167, 167 (1987).
154. Id. at 173; see also Veterans Administration, Department of Medicine and Surgery,
Circular 10-86-71 (June 26, 1986)[hereinafter VA Circular 10-86-71].
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ation of World War II veterans, constituting one third of living
veterans, has now reached retirement age and is increasingly dy-
ing. 55 This growing population of elderly veterans is more likely to
seek medical care from the VA system because of their age and
impoverishment.
156
The veteran feels a sense of entitlement to the medical care the
VA system provides for him, especially (but not exclusively) if his
medical problem is service-related. 57 Notwithstanding this sense of
entitlement, "The Veterans' Health Care Amendments of 1986"15'
established three groups of veteran entitlement/eligibility for VA
hospital and nursing home care.' 59 These parameters of entitlement
have changed to a system where veterans previously secure in their
medical care may no longer qualify. 160
VA medical facilities have the reputation "as health care provid-
ers of last resort [and] places where veterans go when they cannot
receive care anywhere else."' 161 Only a small percentage of veterans
155. Harry Schwartz, Fear of Change Could be VA's Undoing, (April 1992) VA PRACT. at
53, 54.
156. Gronvall, supra note 153, at 174. The group of veterans age 65 and older will in-
crease by 61% before the turn of the century. d at 167.
157. Iris F. Norstrand, VA-Medical School Affiliations: An Unfair Partnership, 262
JAMA 31 (1989). It is said that the primary goal of the VA system is "to care for him who
shall have borne the battle." Id.
158. Pub. L. No. 99-272, 89 Stat. 26.
159. Veterans with service-related conditions, as well as low income veterans, have the
highest entitlement (high priority-Category A) to hospital care. VA CIRCULAR 10-86-71.
Hospital care is to be provided to veterans in the other two groups (Category B and C) if
space is available. The law has established an income-based or "means test" for determining
eligibility for medical care for veterans with non-service related medical conditions. If indi-
vidual income is exceeds the maximum allowed by the means test, care still may be provided
if space is available and the veteran agrees to pay a co-payment. The law eliminated the
existing eligibility of veterans age 65 and over to receive medical care based on age alone. Id.
160. Gronvall, supra note 153, at 173. The "means test" allows eligibility for category A
veteran care if their income falls at or below prescribed income threshold levels of $15,000 for
single veterans and $18,000 for veterans with one dependent. Id. For example, veterans with
non-service related injuries, previously entitled to coverage automatically at the age of 65,
must now also meet the "means test" eligibility requirements to be considered "high prior-
ity," or Category A, and receive that category's absolute entitlement to medical care. Cate-
gories B and C are "low priority," and medical care is provided to veterans in these categories
only when available. Id Before the 1986 amendments elderly veterans were automatically
eligible because it was presumed that they were unable to pay for care. Also, before this
amendment, veterans without service-related conditions "were eligible for VA medical care
only if they stated under oath that they were unable to defray the cost of necessary hospital
care elsewhere. Id. at 170. Certain veterans fall into a special exempt class automatically
entitled to care without regard to income. The excempt classes include; ex-POWs, World
War I veterans and VA pension recipients. Id. at 173.
161. James F. Burgess, Jr. & Theodore Stefos, Federal Provision of Health Care" Creating
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entitled to this care use it. 162 The 1980 census found that only ten
percent of veterans use the VA health care system.1 63 Of this small
group, a significant number have no alternative health care cover-
age. 16 Of those veterans within the population relying on the VA
medical system who have other insurance, a significant number are
covered by "non-private" types of insurance, such as medicaid or
medicare. 165 Although these alternate programs allow him access
to other health care facilities, the VA patient's lower income makes
paying the large co-payments and deductibles imposed by those
programs prohibitive, especially when compared to free VA medical
care. 16 6 Thus, the typical veteran looking to the VA system for his
care relies upon that governmental service and perceives that he is a
"captive" to the system. 167 Veterans having "quality" private in-
surance, such as Blue Cross/Blue Shield, have identified VA hospi-
tals as an additional source of care only thirteen percent of the
time. 1 68 The veteran who has the income or insurance to go else-
where apparently does so.
Recent efforts aimed at holding the line on health care expendi-
tures within the VA medical system (part of the efforts to curb the
soaring federal deficit), have left the veterans who depend on the
system concerned about the availability of care now and in the fu-
ture. 169 The 1986 Amendments have "whittled down" the group
with absolute entitlement to those with service-related injuries or
the very poor.1 70
Access for the Underinsured, 1 J. HEALTH CARE FOR THE POOR & UNDERSERVED 364, 373
(1991).
162. Id.
163. Peter G. Gildschmidt, Health Services Research and Development: The Veterans Ad-
ministration Program, 20 HEALTH SERVIcES Ras. 789, 794 (1986).
164. John A Gronvall, Low Income Veterans in the VA Health Care System, 6 HEALTH
AFFAIRS 167 (1987). Almost 45% of veterans hospitalized in the VA system have no other
health insurance coverage, whereas only 7.8% of veterans treated in non-VA hospitals are
without insurance. Id
165. Id at 171. These "non-private" types of insurance include medicare, medicaid, or
CHAMPUS (Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services), for the mili-
tary, and CHAMPVA (Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Veterans Administra-
tion). The end result is that while 83% of veterans discharged from non-VA hospitals had
private health insurance, only 34% of veterans had either private or a combination of private
and non-private insurance. Id,
166. J. William Hollingsworth, The Role of Veterans Affairs Hospitals in the Health Care
System, 322 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1851, 1852 (1990).
167. See supra notes 135-43 and accompanying text.
168. Gronvall, supra note 164, at 172.
169. See Stewart Powell, Veterans' Care: Condition Critical, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.
(June 6,1986) at 20.
170. See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text. While all veterans within certain
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2. The VA Medical System
The VA medical centers "are a vital resource for the organiza-
tion and delivery of health services to our veterans as well as for the
production of much-needed health manpower and making contribu-
tions to scientific advances in medicine." '171 Presently, the primary
connection between the VA and the private health care sector is
through its affiliations with medical schools, teaching hospitals, and
other institutions that train health care professionals. 172 The result
of this close affiliation is that 134 of 172 VA medical centers are
affiliated with medical schools and more than half of all practicing
U. S. physicians have been at least partially trained in a VA
facility. 173
As a corollary to its affiliations with medical schools, the VA
medical system has also actively supported physicians' research en-
deavors.1 74 VA hospitals have given physicians the opportunity to
provide clinical health care to VA patients while simultaneously al-
lowing them to participate in teaching and research endeavors.1 75
The VA system has actively encouraged this dual activity by provid-
ing both opportunities to obtain special research funds and positions
that allow significant time for medical research.176 These activities
have resulted in "a significant portion of the nation's investment in
medical research ($212 million in fiscal year 1991)... being derived
from the VA appropriations." 177 Up to one-third of all American
physician investigators have been supported by the VA system.1 78
Former VA Secretary Edward J. Derwinski had proposed a
complete reorganization of the VA medical system which would re-
allocate health care reseources to geographic areas where there was
categories of military service were promised free medical care in their old age, now only the
poorest are entitled to it. Id.
171. C. Alex Alexander, Physicians in the Department of Veteran Affairs, 152 ARCH. IN-
TER. MED. 502, 502 (1992). World War II dramatically challenged the capacity of the VA
system. The VA System Department of Medicine and Surgery, established in 1946, expanded
hospital capacity through the creation of working relationships with American medical
schools; see also, John A. Gronvall, The VA's Affiliation with Academic Medicine: An Emer-
gency Post-War Strategy becomes a Permanent Partnership, 64 ACAD. MED. 61, 63 (1989).
172. John K. Iglehart, The Veterans Administration Medical Care System and the Private
Sector, 313 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1552, 1553 (1985).
173. Alexander, supra note 171, at 502.
174. See Gronvall, supra note 171, at 63.
175. Hollingsworth, supra note 166, at 1855.
176. Gronvall, supra note 171, at 63-64.
177. Alexander, supra note 171, at 502.
178. Gronvall, supra note 171, at 63. The VA has been successful in that almost 50% of
the medical graduates remain within the VA system as researchers. Another 25% remain in
research, but practice within non-VA academic positions. Id. at 64.
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the greatest need for them.'7 9 He justified these changes when he
stated that the system was "ill-prepared to meet veterans' current
and future needs" due to its inappropriate emphasis on inpatient (as
opposed to outpatient) care, duplication of services and inability to
care for the growing numbers of aging veterans.'" As part of this
proposal, Derwinski recommended that two underutililized VA fa-
cilities be opened to other paying patients. Responding to a strong
lobbying effort by veterans groups, Congress rejected this
proposal. '8'
Recently, Derwinski resigned from his VA cabinet post to work
on President Bush's reelection campaign. It has been charged that
he was forced from office by angry veterans groups who fear he
would further dilute and streamline VA services into other federal
health care programs. 182
Also, the quality of care within the VA system is allegedly slip-
ping. Many news stories have described overcrowded conditions,
increasing suicide rates among patients, and long waiting periods
for an available VA hospital bed.' 83 In the spring of 1991, North
Chicago VA Medical Center made headlines when it publicly an-
nounced that several veteran deaths were the result of "poor care"
at its facility. 184 Although the VA system is not necessarily in "dire
straits," all agree that the system faces many challenges to main-
taining quality medical care, especially as the large number of
World War II veterans reach old age. 185
Many consider the VA affiliation with medical schools troubled.
Certain commentators complain that the direction of available VA
medical care is determined more by the needs of the academic com-
munity than of the VA patient population.' 86 Others state that the
VA system has only benefitted from affiliation with medical schools,
and the financial constraints of the federal deficit have been the
179. Cathy Tokarski, Political Handcuffs Restrain VA Reform, MOD. HEALTHCARE,
April 2, 1990, at 19.
180. Id.
181. Eric Schmitt, Angry Veterans Groups Say They Made Bush Oust Agency's Head,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1992 at A17.
182. Low Crawl at the White House, WASH. PosT, Sept. 30, 1992, at A22 (Editorial
Page).
183. Tokarski, supra note 179, at 19.
184. Jonathan Sunshine, North Chicago and VA Values, VA PRACTIONER January, 1992
at 63.
185. Judy Packer, VA Budget Gets Boost from Gulf War, MOD. HEALTHCARE, April 22,
1991 at 22.




prime justification for cuts in available services.187 Since the medi-
cal school connection has been successful in many ways in the past,
it is considered unlikely to change in the future. 88 Consequently,
the VA patient will continue to be exposed to countless opportuni-
ties to participate in medical research with the medical residents
and academically involved practitioners.
III. PRISONERS: A CLASSIC "VULNERABLE GROUP"
Prisoners are very similar to VA medical patients in that they
are both captive and economically disadvantaged. While confine-
ment by the state makes the prisoner more vulnerable than the VA
patient, the underlying causes of their vulnerability are similar. Of
the two elements often lacking in vulnerable populations, capacity
and autonomy, prisoners and VA patients both experience problems
with autonomy rather than capacity. 18
9
Although rarely used for nontherapeutic research before World
War II, American prisoners were extensively used to develop treat-
ments for war-related afflictions of the armed forces during that
conflict.190 After World War II, research continued on prisoners in
American prisons. Prisoners participated in projects by pharmaceu-
tical manufacturers for Phase I drug and cosmetic testing, 191 in
other nonrelated forms of therapeutic research, and in studies re-
lated to the causes and effects of incarceration.19 2
Senate hearings in 1973 reviewing research involving prisoners
exposed problems surrounding their participation. 9 3 These con-
cerns, especially coupled with the abuses exposed in the Nuremberg
trials,19 4 led Congress to specifically include prisoners in the man-
187. See Hollingsworth, supra note 166.
188. Iglehart, supra note 172, at 1553.
189. Protection of Human Subjects, 38 Fed. Reg., supra note 2, at 31,740. Since veterans
are exclusively within the adult population, the issues raised within the vulnerable groups of
children, pregnant women and fetuses will be very dissimilar from those of VA medical pa-
tients. Id.
190. THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BI-
OMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, RESEARCH INVOLVING PRISONERS: REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (1976) [hereinafter PRISONERS' REPORT].
191. Id. Phase I drug testing is a type of research primarily done by the pharmaceutical
manufacturers as part of the clinical testing necessary to license new drugs. In these clinical
trials, healthy subjects receive successively larger doses of a drug to evaluate its action and
safety. Id.; see also Barber, supra note 12, at 157.
192. PRISONERS' REPORT, supra note 190, at 2.
193. Id. at 3. The hearings examined the advantages of using prisoners, administrative
availability, and concerns about "exploitation, secrecy, danger and the impossibility of ob-
taining informed consent." Id.
194. See, eg., ANNAS, supra note 35, at 104.
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date to the National Commission to study and make recommenda-
tions concerning their involvement in medical research. 195 A later
section will detail the analysis and recommendations made by the
National Commission for use of prisoners in medical research.
A. Why Prisoners Are a Vulnerable Population
Prisoners offer a clear example of a captive population that must
rely on the government to provide almost all fundamental health
and human services. Prisoners are physically captive and look to
prison authorities for virtually all of their personal needs. By defini-
tion and design, there is an extremely unequal power structure be-
tween the inmates and prison officials. Compounding their physical
confinement, prisoners are also subject to many attacks on their
self-image through deprivation and control.' 96 Prisoners live in a
situation of social and economic deprivation. 197 These harsh living
conditions has led commentators to argue that prisoners are in a
situation totally incompatible with the exercise of free choice.
198
There are several ways in which external influences on the pris-
oner reach a level extreme enough to rob him of his capacity to
consent. The two major influences are the inherently threatening or
coercive nature of the prison environment and the extremes to
which individual prisoners will go to improve their personal situa-
tion within the prison.199 The National Commission did not sug-
gest that overt threats by guards was the typical method for
recruiting research participation. 2" However, promises of release
or sentence reduction as rewards for research participation were
considered inherently coercive. Such promises, although positive,
195. Kathleen Schroeder, A Recommendation to the FDA Concerning Drug Research on
Prisoners, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 969, 971 (1983). Earlier reports of up to 85% of new drug
studies used prisoners as study populations had dropped to a much lower figure by 1980. See
also FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 8, at 214-16. The National Commission evaluated
the appropriate use of prisoners in research in light of the ethical principles of respect for
persons and justice. Congress directed that it determine: (1) whether prisoners bear a fair
share of the burdens and receive a fair share of the benefits of research; and (2) whether
prisoners are, in the words of the Nuremberg Code, "so situated as to be able to exercise free
power of choice"-- that is, whether prisoners can give truly voluntary consent to participate
in research. PRISONERS' REPORT, supra note 190, at 5.
196. PRISONERS' REPORT, supra note 190, at 56.
197. Id. at 6.
198. LEVINE, supra note 3, at 278.
199. Roy Branson, Philosophical Perspectives on Experimentation with Prisoners, in THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, RESEARCH INVOLVING PRISONERS: APPENDIX TO REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, 1-1 to 1-41 (1976) [hereinafter PRISONERS' REPORT-APPENDIX].
200. See generally PRISONERS' REPORT, supra note 190.
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were coercive because they implied a threat of extended imprison-
ment for noncompliant subjects.201
When the general conditions in the prison are very poor, the
research facilities may provide a living environment significantly
better than normal prison conditions. 20 2 When conditions are such
that the only way a prisoner can obtain decent living accomodations
or basic medical care is as a research participant, that situation is
coercive.20 3 In this situation, the environment instead of an individ-
ual makes offers to alleviate severe economic deprivation
204coercive.
One commentator has described prisoners' consent to partici-
pate in research as "cheap consent" which mocks the prisoners'
right to choose appropriately.20 5 Manipulation which results in a
reduction of the available options could effectively deny a person
the ability to make a rational choice. Individual choice has a ra-
tional basis only if a variety of alternatives exist. Would the signifi-
cant number of prisoners who volunteer for research to improve
their living conditions or to earn significantly higher incomes par-
ticipate as freely if their baseline conditions were better?20 6 Because
the ability to make a rational choice is restricted when the range of
available options is limited, manipulating available alternatives de-
nies a person of his right to make an autonomous decision.
B. National Commission Recommendations
The National Commission recognized that the ethical principle
of respect for persons required that prisoners be given the opportu-
nity to participate as research subjects.20 7 They concluded, how-
ever, that prisons are so inherently coercive that protection from
external exploitation was necessary.20 8
One hurdle to the ethical use of prisoners for research is created
by cash payments for participation. The FDA considered cash pay-
ments to be a benefit for subjects within the risk-benefit analysis. 2°
201. ANNAS, supra note 35, at 115.
202. Id. at 113.
203. LEVINE, supra note 3, at 278.
204. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 8, at 344.
205. Cornel West, Philosophical Perspective on the Participation of Prisoners in Experi-
mental Research, in PRISONERS' REPORT APPENDIX, supra note 199, 2-1.
206. Id.
207. Research Involving Prisoners, supra note 149, at 3078.
208. Id.
209. Ruth Macklin, The Paradoxical Case of Payments as Benefit to Research Subjects, 11
IRB: A REV. OF HuM. SUBjECus REs. 1 (1989).
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Payment for participation creates a paradox for subjects: the higher
the monetary payment, the greater the benefit, but also the greater
potential that subjects will be unduly influenced to participate.210
However, if the research sponsor is permitted to pay signifi-
cantly less for subjects because they are from a captive population,
this gives the sponsor an unfair financial advantage that would en-
courage the selection of captive populations over more expensive,
noncaptive ones.211 On the other hand, comparable cash payments
could result in undue influence within a prison system of lower
212wages. 2 Alternate suggestions were made to resolve the
injustice.213
Because the National Commission found that prisoners were a
vulnerable group, they demanded that enhanced informed consent
standards be employed or less vulnerable groups be selected.214 The
National Commission declared that only certain types of research
should involve prisoners,21 5 including therapeutic studies involving
traditional medical treatment as well as innovative therapy likely to
improve the individual prisoner's health.216
Absent stringent controls by a national ethical review body,
prisoners were not to be used as subjects for nontherapeutic re-
search.217 The National Commission wanted to encourage the in-
volvement of noncaptive populations as research subjects, over
captive prison population unless there were "compelling reasons"
for the use of the captive prison population.218 All categories of
research must be reviewed by a local prison IRB with a defined
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. LEVINE, supra note 3, at 282-83.
213. PRISONERS' REPORT, supra note 190, at 59. For example, one recommendation to
the National Commission was that prisoners be paid the prevailing prison wage, and that the
difference between this and rates for outside subjects be placed into a fund to raise prison
wages in general. Id.
214. Id. at 37; see also LEVINE, supra note 3, at 236.
215. LEVINE, supra note 3, at 286. Studies of prisons as institutions and prisoners were
encouraged because they are likely to benefit the prisoners as a class of persons and there are
no other substitute populations. Id.
216. Research Involving Prisoners, supra note 149, at 3080. The National Commission
did not wish to restrict research likely to personally benefit the subject. Id.
217. Id. The research must fulfill an important social and scientific need, with compel-
ling reasons for prisoner involvement, prisoner involvement must be "equitable," and require
optimal prison conditions allowing a high degree of voluntariness such as adequate living
conditions, workable grievance procedures and public scrutiny. See also LEVINE, supra note
3, at 289. The fact that prisoners are administratively available is not a compelling reason to
include them in research protocols. Id
218. LEVINE, supra note 3, at 290.
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membership of much greater diversity than that required for the
general population.219 In addition, the competence of all investiga-
tors must be verified by" the head of the responsible federal depart-
ment or agency." 22
0
C. Strict Supervision Versus an Absolute Ban
The underlying conclusion by the National Commission was
that the closed and coercive nature of prisons seriously curtailed,
but did not totally eliminate, prisoners' capability to provide in-
formed consent. 221 That determination led the Commission to rec-
ommend an extremely high "compelling need" standard for
experimentation which would not directly benefit the individual
prisoner or his general class.
Two reports to the National Commission asserted that with cer-
tain additional protections, prisoners could voluntarily consent to
research participation. One report examined the prisoner's value
system and its impact on voluntary choice.2 22 Prisoners were seen
as comprising diverse groups of divergent identities and goals.
223
Prisoners volunteered to participate in research either for altruistic
or pragmatic reasons or to maximize their comfort by participating
in research when benefits outweigh costs. 224  A second report
agreed that research on prisoners should be restricted rather than
denied. 225 This report acknowledged the difficulty in obtaining con-
sent when such a wide disparity in bargaining power existed, but
concluded that consent could be obtained if minimal human rights
could be protected and adequately open communication between
the inmates and the public could be maintained.226
219. Research Involving Prisoners, supra note 149, at 3081. IRB membership must in-
clude prisoners or their advocates, clergy, community representatives, scientists and medical
personnel "not associated with the conduct of the research or prison and be of diverse racial
and cultural backgrounds." Protection of Human Subjects, supra note 102, § 46.304.
220. Id.
221. LEVINE, supra note 3, at 281.
222. Jackwell Susman, Two Images of the Prison Influence Structure and Their Meaning
for Prisoner Participation in Biomedical and Behavioral Research, in PRISONERS' REPORT
APPENDIX, supra note 199, at 4-1 (1976).
223. Id. at 4-9. Because different groups of prisoners identify with different groups or
people outside of prison, they bring these sub-cultural norms and values with them into
prison and its society. Id.
224. Id. at 4-1, 4-8 to 4-18. See also Schroeder, supra note 195, at 977.
225. John Irwin, An Acceptable Context for Biomedical Research, in PRISONERS' REPORT





In 1978, HHS responded to the National Commission recom-
mendations by publishing final regulations on research using prison-
ers as subjects. Rather than following the National Commission,
which would have permitted non-therapeutic research on prisoners
if strict requirements were met, the HHS regulations banned this
type of research entirely.227 Therapeutic research where prisoners
might be assigned to control groups also required prior national
public notice and approval.2 2 8 The HHS regulations also stated
that prison IRB membership must include a prisoner representa-
tive, as well as a majority of members having no prison associa-
tion.22 9 In addition, the local prison IRB was to ensure an
appropriate risk-benefit analysis, a subject selection program free of
arbitrary prison intervention, and avoidance of manipulation or un-
due influence.23 °
Reacting to concerns expressed by prisoners in legal actions, the
FDA stayed the effective date of its regulations and published new
proposed regulations in December 198 1.231 The final FDA regula-
tions did not completely ban nontherapeutic research. Rather, the
FDA adopted the prohibitive "compelling need to use prisoners"
standard recommended by the National Commission.232 The
FDA's revised regulations stated that the agency had previously
omitted the "compelling need" standard because it was considered
an unreachable goal.2 33
227. Id. § 46.306.
228. Id. § 46.306a. Research involving control groups containing prisoners, or research
on conditions particularly affecting prisoners may proceed "only after the Secretary has con-
sulted with appropriate experts... and published notice, in the Federal Register, of his intent
to approve such research." Id.
229. Protection of Human Subjects, supra note 102, § 46.304.
230. IdL § 46.305a.
231. LEVINE, supra note 3, at 294. In response to the initial HHS prisoner regulations of
1980, which banned non-therapeutic research, Jackson State prisoners filed a lawsuit chal-
lenging these regulations as violative of their constitutional right to participate in non-thera-
peutic Phase I clinical trials. Protection of Human Subjects; Prisoners Used as Subjects in
Research, 45 Fed. Reg. 36,386 (1980). Fante and The Upjohn Co. v. Department of Health
and Human Services, Civ. Action No. 80-72778, U.S.Dist. Ct., E.D. Mich., 1980. See also
LEVINE, supra note 3, at 294. Other prisoners, who felt that their participation in non-thera-
peutic research was involuntary and therefore unconstitutional, due to poor prison condi-
tions, were denied relief in an unrelated action. In denying relief, the court found, indirectly,
that prison conditions were neither inherently coercive nor inherently incompatible with au-
tonomous research participation decisions. Bailey v. Lally, 481 F.Supp. 203 (D. Md. 1979).
232. Id. at 295. The FDA felt that no research would be found to meet this standard, so
the category was still effectively banned. LEVINE, supra note 3, at 295.
233. Protection of Human Subjects, 46 Fed.Reg. 61,666, 61,668 (1981). FDA concluded
that in view of the National Commission's finding that prisons are inherently coercive and of
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Post-regulatory analysis has questioned the need for the FDA
and HHS to impose a defacto ban on nontherapeutic research
within prisons.234 The goals of the National Commission to assure
adequate standards of justice and voluntariness could also be met
with additional safeguards, that still allow the prisoners the right to
choose for themselves.235
The National Commission's primary concern was that the pris-
oners would choose to participate in research for improper or inva-
lid reasons.236 Certain commentators have taken the extreme
position that involvement for any materialistic reasons is unethical
because the nature of the commodity at risk involved is one's own
health and body rather than something less essential.237 More mod-
erate commentators have stated that weighing the potential risks of
research participation against the benefit of financial gain is accepta-
ble within reasonable limits. 238
The controversy over the choice between an absolute ban or re-
stricted use of certain categories of certain categories of experimen-
tation is directly related to the degree of perceived inability to
obtain appropriate consent from prisoners. Those who perceive no
external protection strong enough to insure autonomous consent
favor an absolute ban. Others, while acknowledging the possibility
of external control, still recommend its prohibition due to ease of
administration.
IV. SHOULD VA MEDICAL PATIENTS BY CONSIDERED
A VULNERABLE GROUP?
The VA medical patients should be identified as a vulnerable
population in order to best protect their capacity to give informed
consent in medical research settings. Examining the VA patient's
ability to consent under the contract law model highlights points of
heightened vulnerability. 239
the lack of evidence that other groups of potential research subjects could not be found, the
need to protect prisoners outweighed any need to use prisoners that had yet been presented to
FDA. Thus, it appeared to the agency that sponsors of research could never establish a
compelling need to use prisoners. Id.
234. See generally Schroeder, supra note 195.
235. Id. at 999-1000.
236. ANNAS, supra note 35, at 106.
237. Marx W. Wartofsky, On Doing It For Money, in PRISONERS' REPORT APPENDIX,
supra note 199. When a subject puts his personal health at risk reasons other than freely given
such as in exchange for money or material reward, "the act is akin to prostitution." See also
PRISONERS' REPORT, supra note 190, at 53.
238. See generally Irwin, supra note 225.
239. See supra notes 58-79 and accompanying text.
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Lack of appropriate capacity to consent was one of the two pri-
mary concerns identified by those evaluating vulnerable groups.2"
Capacity to consent is a baseline determination required for measur-
ing whether a particular group in question possesses the ability to
consent to research participation. VA medical patients, like prison-
ers, possess the capacity to consent in the sense that they are legally
competent adults. Nevertheless, the prisoners' inherent capacity to
consent did not prevent their classification by the National Com-
mission as vulnerable, nor should it for VA patients.
Autonomy is the second primary concern identified by those
studying vulnerable populations. When a class is considered com-
petent to consent, but there is a strong suspicion that individual
actions taken by members of this class are not autonomous, then
that class is also considered vulnerable.241 The contract model has
previously shown the more power is divided unequally, as in a sub-
ject/investigator relationship, the greater the threat autonomy will
be lost in negotiations for consent. While an investigator's appeal to
participate in medical research will be merely persuasive for some
patients, for others, this influence will manipulate or coerce in ways
that effectively deny autonomous informed consent. These subjec-
tive interpretations of the external influences must be considered
when there is a suspicion that individuals within a class of compe-
tent people are not freely choosing research participation. These
influences have been previously identified and will now be evaluated
as they effect VA patients.242
Coercion has been found incompatible with effective informed
consent.243 Coercion goes beyond overt threats of harm. For exam-
ple, in the prison context promises of early release or sentence re-
duction in exchange for research participation constitute coercion.
There is no indication that the VA patients experience any overt
coercive threats. VA patients, like prisoners, are subject to more
subtle coercive influences.
The potential for unacceptable methods of manipulating of the
VA patient to participate in medical research can take many forms.
The question of when persuasion rises to manipulation or coercion
can best be answered from the patient's subjective perspective.
When a patient's fears are not are not likely to be realized, an
objective reasonable person standard might fail to consider certain
240. See Kjervik, supra note 58, at 194.
241. LEVINE, supra note 3, at 97.
242. See supra notes 76-92 and accompanying text.
243. See supra note 176.
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incentives an infringement on effective consent. Because it is the
individual's subjective interpretation of the situation that may serve
to deny him the right to freely choose to participate in research, any
objective standards used in groups particularly vulnerable should be
reformulated to account for this greater subjective vulnerability.
1. Captive
The VA patient clearly belongs in the category of captive popu-
lations. The typical VA patient, because of his legislated entitle-
ment to health care, is uniquely dependent upon the VA medical
system to meet his medical needs if he cannot afford alternative
health care coverage. 2" This type of captivity is similar to that of
prisoners because his only choice is to accept that offered by the
government (through the VA hospital or prison infirmary, respec-
tively) or to forego treatment altogether.24 5
The VA patient also shares with the prisoner a second, more
unusual dimension of captivity. The VA system of medical facilities
is structured so that patients may normally obtain care only from
the nearest VA hospital. As a result, the dissatisfied VA patient can-
not transfer to another VA facility. Moreover, this patient, who is
also typically poor, cannot easily afford to transfer to other indigent
care facilities because of the large copayments and deductibles re-
quired for other public asssisted health coverage.2 46 Thus, the VA
patient is both restrained economically to use the VA hospital and
also geographically restrained to a particular medical facility. 4 7
Although technically not a prisoner, the VA patient, as a result of
his circumstances, is likely to feel that he must seek medical care at
a particular VA medical facility or face the possibility of no medical
attention at all.
Athough most people are dependent upon others, captive popu-
lations' dependence upon others for fundamental personal services,
such as medical care, may make them more susceptible to control
by their caretakers. 248 Because the VA patient is captive within the
system, he is more dependent on VA medical personnel than a pa-
244. See supra notes 135-137 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 196-201 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 167-170 and accompanying text. This type of environmental restric-
tion is not shared by other indigents looking for state-assisted medical care because typically
there is a greater number of medical centers providing this care within a geographic location.
VA patients may also be eligible for other state-assisted care, but copayments and deductibles
make it prohibitively expensive.
247. Reatig, supra note 142, at 182.
248. See supra notes 137-40 and accompanying text.
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tient of a private caregiver and consequently more likely to react
passively to research participation requests. This greater depen-
dency potentially creates an environment fostering unintentional
manipulation, by role constraints, in which an investigator's expec-
tations of VA patient participation inadvertantly compel his
compliance.
The VA patient cannot give effective informed consent if he feels
powerless and trapped within the VA medical system, and these
feelings lead him passively to allow others to dictate or control his
personal decisions.249 The VA patient is particularly susceptible be-
cause he is a captive within the VA system and must be protected
against passive manipulation in this dependent situation.
2. Economically Disadvantaged
The typical VA medical patient is relatively impoverished com-
pared to the general public. Unless the veteran has a service-related
injury, he cannot use the VA medical system if his personal income
rises above a legislatively mandated level.25° Even the geriatric vet-
eran can no longer use the VA system if he has moderate personal
wealth.251 For these reasons, the population using the VA medical
system can easily be characterized as economically disadvan-
taged.252 In addition to this relative poverty leading to excessively
passive behavior by the VA patient, the economically disadvantaged
VA patient may be unusually affected in other ways.
When a subject is impoverished, there is a greater risk that the
financial compensation offered to join a research protocol will un-
duly manipulate this participation. 53 The poorer the subject, the
greater the potential that "cash payments" for research participa-
tion will excessively influence or manipulate his decision. While it
is recognized "that some inducement is necessary to prompt a suffi-
cient number of people to volunteer to serve as research sub-
jects,"' 254 beyond a certain point this inducement becomes undue.
"Inducements that would ordinarily be acceptable may become un-
due influences if the subject is especially vulnerable." '255
The poor VA patient is particularly susceptible to undue induce-
249. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 107-110 and accompanying text.
251. Id.
252. See generally Gronvall, supra note 164.
253. LEVINE, supra note 3, at 82.
254. Macklin, supra note 71, at 1.
255. BELMONT REPORT, supra note 1, at 4.
296 [Vol. 2:259
VA PATIEN7
ments of cash payments to entice his research participation as is the
prisoner. Since most VA patients are poor, any significant amount
of money has the potential to be so desirable that refusal to partici-
pate is not a realistic alternative. Lacking available alternatives for
affordable medical care, VA patient's consent also can be character-
ized as "cheap consent" which denies the VA patient his inherent
right to freely choose research participation.
3. Threats and Manipulation
When patients dependent upon an outside organization feel
threatened, they are more likely to be manipulated. The environ-
ment in which the VA patient exists threatens his continued medical
care in several ways.
The entitlement to medical care provided to veterans was signifi-
cantly restricted in the Veterans' Health Care Amendments of
1986.256 Also, commentators note a correlation between the lessen-
ing legitimacy of veterans' claims to separate medical care and the
lack of any major war within the last several decades.257 As the
personal memories of veterans' sacrifices in World War I and II
decreases, so does the perceived validity of veteran's claim of enti-
tlement to special separate health care coverage.258 The veteran's
unique entitlement to health care has also diminished as more
Americans today support the idea of universal health insurance for
all citizens, which would encompass the VA system, Medicaid, and
Medicare.259
The fear that these growing sentiments has raised among veter-
ans is exemplified in the pressure that veterans groups reportedly
used to force the ouster of Veterans Affairs Secretary Edward J.
Derwinski. 2 ' Although Derwinski had been very successful at in-
creasing the VA budget in troubled economic times, 26' he "ran afoul
of the large veterans groups by pressing for a pilot program that
would have opened a VA hospital in Virginia and another one in
Alabama to poor, rural residents who lacked adequate medical
care." 262 "[V]eterans groups saw or portrayed the experiment as a
256. See supra notes 159-162 and accompanying text.
257. Harry Schwartz, Running the Resource Race, 9 VA PRACT. 53 (1992).
258. Id. at 54.
259. Id.
260. Schmitt, supra note 181.
261. Id.
262. Ann Devry & Bill McAllister, Derwinski Quits Bush's Cabinet; Move to Campaign
Follows Calls by Veterans Groups for Ouster, WASH. PosT, Sept. 27, 1992, at Al, A23. In
February [1992], less than five hours after the Senate voted 91 to 3 to block the pilot program,
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first step toward the possible merger of the veterans' and civilian
health care systems, and the secretary was forced to back down." '263
The VA patient may be justifiably concerned about his ability to
continue receiving quality health care when he reads published re-
ports about services available within the VA system. News media
coverage of veteran deaths and poor quality care abound.2 The
quality of health care in the VA system is considered by many to be
questionable and steadily deteriorating.265 Indeed, many veterans
consider the quality and availability of their future care extremely
uncertain.26 6 Their care, although an entitlement, may well be van-
ishing into a mire of second class service and denied benefits.
Given the current status of the VA system and the necessity that
an individual patient use only the area VA hospital, it is easy to
understand individual VA patients fearing that refusal to participate
in medical research may jeopardize their status within the VA medi-
cal system. Effective informed consent will be threatened if the VA
patient, for whatever reason, translates concerns for the future
availability of his medical care into a fear that this future care will
be further jeopardized if he fails to cooperate with a request to par-
ticipate in research. This leads to "cheap consent" which mocks
the VA patient's right to appropriately choose research participa-
tion just as it did with prisoners.267
The key question in the process of protecting VA patients is
when does persuasion to participate in medical research become
manipulation or coercion which effectively denies informed consent
for the VA patient. VA patients must be protected in whatever way
necessary to maintain substantial autonomy in making the decision
to participate in medical research. It is imperative that any objec-
tive, reasonable person standard used to answer this question be
modified in ways that strengthen the informed consent process.
The VA patient must be protected against the dramatically greater
likelihood of overt or passive manipulation which are inherent in
unequal or dependent relationships such as the one in which the VA
patient finds himself. Although the class of VA patients is consid-
ered competent to consent to participate in medical research, how-
Mr. Derwinski announced that he was withdrawing the plan because of veteran opposition.
Schmitt, supra note 181, at A17.
263. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 185-87 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
266. Powell, supra note 169, at 22.
267. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
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ever, individually there is a great deal of suspicion that particular
choices are not made autonomously, therefore, this class should be
considered vulnerable and afforded the appropriate additional
protection.
E. The VA System Has Failed to Protect Patients Because of its
Failure to Identify Them as a Vulnerable Population.
The VA medical system manages itself in a manner that implies
its recognition of vulnerable population status, but it has never offi-
cially labeled the VA patient as vulnerable. Because this population
can be shown to be vulnerable, it is essential that it be labeled as
such immediately in order to properly evaluate its appropriate use
as a research subject body.
The VA system recognized a greater than normal need for pro-
tection within its patient population when it applied additional reg-
ulations for research on VA patients. These stricter regulations
include prohibition of expedited review of research protocols by
IRBs, prohibition of short form or waiver of certain consent re-
quirements, and cash payments in all but limited circumstances.268
This stricter requirement that the VA system has imposed upon it-
self reveals its concern that informed consent is threatened to the
extent that the local IRB analysis is insufficient to protect its pa-
tients against undue external influence.
These additional protections, however, pale next those given to
other vulnerable groups. For example, the use of prisoners in re-
search, has been restricted to a compelling need standard for certain
categories of research that virtually bans all nontherapeutic re-
search and requires prior national public notice and approval for
therapeutic research using subject control groups. Prison IRB
membership has been redefined to include more outsiders free from
prison supervision and heightened scrutiny to ensure a selection
program free of arbitrary prison intervention.
Informed consent has developed into a complex, rigid set of reg-
ulations with the local IRB acting as the watchdog of the subjects'
interests. But the IRBs suffer from a lack of organized communica-
tion between units. Adequate protection provided at one center
may not be consistently duplicated at another without express iden-
tification of this group as "vulnerable." VA patients will be better
protected if the VA system recognizes their status as a vulnerable
268. See supra notes 123-30 and accompanying text.
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group and modifies the objective standards for their inclusion in re-
search appropriately.
Once the VA patients are identified as a vulnerable population,
ethical considerations require an evaluation of its equitable use as a
research subject body. The National Commission recommended
that groups particularly vulnerable to external control be avoided as
sources for research subjects when other less vulnerable groups can
be used and specific justification of their inclusion is required.269
For example, when the prisoner population was evaluated by the
National Commission for acceptable conditions under which pris-
oners could safely participate in research, only therapeutic research
was permitted. This justification for therapeutic research developed
because participation in the research offered the potential for per-
sonal gain.270 Whether an absolute ban on the use of VA patients is
warranted has to be answered, but only following research under-
taken to assess the nature and extent of the inherent vulnerability of
this population. Although VA patients are not vulnerable enough
to justify imposing a research ban, the strength of the external influ-
ences that threaten to deny their autonomous right to freely choose
research participation must not be ignored.
In general, the additional burdens of research participation ethi-
cally can be offset if the benefits of improved medical technology are
also offered to the VA patient. There is no data that indicates VA
patients are denied the resulting benefits of research conducted
upon them. Patients who participate in therapeutic research poten-
tially may receive benefits from new forms of medical therapy. But
if the financial constraints and service cutbacks which currently
plague the VA medical system result in fewer of these benefits
reaching the VA patient, then the additional burdens of using a
group more vulnerable will not be adequately offset and the ethical
principle of comparative justice will be violated.
It is obvious that the VA affiliation with medical schools has
been very profitable for the VA system and the medical community
as a whole.27 This affiliation would suffer seriously if the opportu-
nities for research investigation were eliminated within the VA pop-
ulation. Although these benefits to medical education cannot be
ignored, the special needs of the VA patient also must be addressed.
269. Lebacqz, supra note 147, at 3; see also supra notes 241-249 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 25-35 and accompanying text.




The VA medical patient must be officially recognized by the VA
medical system as a vulnerable group. Once this step is taken, the
objective standard used to determine the presence of adequate in-
formed consent must be strengthened for the VA patient in order to
provide adequate protection that his subjective concerns will not
create a situation which coerces or manipulates his decision to par-
ticipate in medical research. The "just" use of VA patients in re-
search must be evaluated and affiliations with academic medicine
modified, if necessary, to protect the VA patient first and foremost
above all other interests or concerns. Most of the people using the
services have no viable alternatives to adequate medical care. The
poverty of the patients, when combined with the entitlement to free
medical care without costly co-payments and deductibles, make the
services provided by the VA system difficult to refuse. In addition,
the typical VA medical patient is also the captive of the VA hospital
in his region. As a result, the VA patient may perceive himself to be
without options with respect to the system providing his care.
Many have questioned why the VA patient population should be
protected when similar populations are not. While several groups
may show traits similar to being captive or impoverished, few do to
the same extent as the VA patient. While other groups, such as
pharmaceutical company employees, and medical or psychology
students are in restrictive situations similar to the VA patient, they
usually are not as impoverished to the extent Veteran's eligible for
VA care are impoverished. Other groups, such as the welfare pa-
tient, the Medicaid and Medicare patient may be equally impover-
ished, but they can usually obtain some type of medical care from
more than one facility within any given geographic location. How-
ever, nothing should preclude the knowledge gained from research
on the VA population from being extended to resolve similar
problems affecting the other groups mentioned.
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